Possible attack vectors
Posted: Mon Feb 10, 2025 9:30 am
If any of these values are tampered with, especially the PLC values, the alloy may be ruined.
The plant's campus network consists of various components, each of which can be attacked by potential attackers. To penetrate the core network, they will have to find a vulnerable device on which they can gain a foothold in order to intercept traffic and perform malicious actions.
During the research, we identified the following entry points for attackers to compromise the backbone network:
backbone network service servers;
virtual machines and containers;
network equipment;
base stations.
Types of attacks
In each of these areas, attackers can use different georgia mobile database to disrupt the steel plant. Here are some of them.
Intercepting MQTT communications
In modern production management systems, data from IIoT sensors and devices is transmitted to the MQTT server, which routes it to the logging server and the analytical system. There are two protocol versions for data transmission: MQTT and MQTTS. In the first case, data is transmitted in plain text, in the second, it is encrypted similar to http/https. It is noteworthy that unencrypted data exchange is often used by critical IIoT devices installed directly on the executive equipment. Substitution of telemetry data from these devices allows an intruder to surreptitiously interfere with the technological process and disrupt production.
Modbus/TCP interception
The Modbus protocol is still widely used in equipment control networks. TCP port 502 is used for data transmission, and if a VPN is not enabled between remote sites and the control network, or if Modbus servers are directly connected to the campus network, an attacker can replace data in protocol packets and disrupt production.
PLC attacks
If the PLC is not protected from read/write, an attacker can load a malicious version of the firmware and control the operation of this controller. But even if the PLC is protected, the attacker has the ability to reboot the PLC to sabotage production.
The plant's campus network consists of various components, each of which can be attacked by potential attackers. To penetrate the core network, they will have to find a vulnerable device on which they can gain a foothold in order to intercept traffic and perform malicious actions.
During the research, we identified the following entry points for attackers to compromise the backbone network:
backbone network service servers;
virtual machines and containers;
network equipment;
base stations.
Types of attacks
In each of these areas, attackers can use different georgia mobile database to disrupt the steel plant. Here are some of them.
Intercepting MQTT communications
In modern production management systems, data from IIoT sensors and devices is transmitted to the MQTT server, which routes it to the logging server and the analytical system. There are two protocol versions for data transmission: MQTT and MQTTS. In the first case, data is transmitted in plain text, in the second, it is encrypted similar to http/https. It is noteworthy that unencrypted data exchange is often used by critical IIoT devices installed directly on the executive equipment. Substitution of telemetry data from these devices allows an intruder to surreptitiously interfere with the technological process and disrupt production.
Modbus/TCP interception
The Modbus protocol is still widely used in equipment control networks. TCP port 502 is used for data transmission, and if a VPN is not enabled between remote sites and the control network, or if Modbus servers are directly connected to the campus network, an attacker can replace data in protocol packets and disrupt production.
PLC attacks
If the PLC is not protected from read/write, an attacker can load a malicious version of the firmware and control the operation of this controller. But even if the PLC is protected, the attacker has the ability to reboot the PLC to sabotage production.