As a result, Alexey Fedorov concludes

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At the same time, a specialist in the field of computer theory and systems, a lecturer at the Department of Computer Science at the University of Texas at Austin, Scott Aaronson, expressed very serious skepticism regarding the work of Chinese researchers. The main reason is the ambiguous convergence of quantum approximate optimization algorithms, which Scott Aaronson called suitable only for solving purely theoretical problems. The expert also doubted the efficiency of Klaus Schnorr's methods.

Many Russian experts are netherlands cell phone number list also skeptical. For example, Alexey Fedorov, head of the Quantum Information Technologies research group at the Russian Quantum Center, commented on the results of the Chinese researchers as follows: "The Schnorr method still does not have a correct complexity estimate. It is assumed that it is exponential, and the main labor intensity is concentrated not in solving the SVP, but in the set of a sufficient number of such problems - as in the sieve method of a number field, a set of a sufficient number of relations is required for factorization. It follows that the Schnorr method, apparently, does not scale to RSA numbers actually used in modern cryptography. The method allows you to get only an approximate solution to the SVP, which is relatively easy to correct for small numbers and low-dimensional lattices, but is almost impossible for the parameters of cryptosystems actually used. The Schnorr method is not transferred to cryptosystems on elliptic curves (GOST 34.10-2018)."

: "This method, in all likelihood, does not lead to instant cracking of existing cryptographic algorithms, therefore the emergence of new classical and quantum cryptanalysis algorithms is an important argument on the path to the implementation of post-quantum cryptography."

QApp CEO Anton Guglya also believes that the Chinese researchers' claims are far from reality: "The Schnorr algorithm works well for small numbers, but cannot be applied in practice to attack real-world cryptographic mechanisms. The estimate of the parameters of the quantum computer required to implement this attack at 372 qubits is, in all likelihood, significantly underestimated. A more realistic estimate is the correctly substantiated estimate obtained in 2021, which is 20 million qubits."

Alexey Urivskiy believes that the results of Chinese researchers are just a hypothesis that appears regularly: "Firstly, no one currently has access to a quantum computer with the required number and - this is important! - quality of qubits to test computability. Now the researchers have conducted an experiment only on a "toy" sized module. Secondly, when formulating the hypothesis, empirical estimates of the complexity of the Schnorr algorithm, proposed in 2021, which the researchers accelerated with quantum computing, were used. However, these empirical estimates have not been confirmed, much less proven. Therefore, the hypothesis of the Chinese researchers remains just a hypothesis for now. And hypotheses presented as a result about hacking some known cryptographic mechanism appear quite regularly."

Nevertheless, Anton Guglya believes that if measures are not taken now, the consequences of compromising traditional encryption could become truly catastrophic - almost all data ever transmitted over the Internet, including personal, financial, medical, will be available to an intruder who saves network traffic today for its decryption in the future: electronic banking and electronic document management systems will be destroyed, digital assets will lose value. However, in his opinion, the international scientific and technological community is actively preparing for such a scenario, developing software solutions for information security based on post-quantum cryptography - new encryption methods that protect data from attacks using both classical and quantum computers.